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NOTES
formity in the federal law. More stringent environmental standards -
should be mandated, as in the past, by Congress, thereby providing
clear notice to the states of their roles and responsibilities in cleaning
up the environment.
CAROL GLAUBMAN KROCH
Estate Tax — Charitable Deduction: Cemetery not a Charitable Or-
ganization — Child v. United States'—Elizabeth M. Haas died in
January, 1969 leaving a sizeable estate which was disposed of by will.
Among the will's provisions were bequests to two non-profit cemetery
associations — the Watertown Cemetery Association and the Grove
Cemetery Association 2 — which offered burial services to any person
able to pay the standard fees. The executor of the estate 3 claimed that
both bequests were deductible under section 2055(a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code)4 for purposes of assessing the federal estate
tax. 5 This section permits deduction of bequests to organizations
which "are organized and operated exclusively for ... charitable pur-
poses." The Internal Revenue Service, however, did not allow either
bequest as a deduction. The executor paid the assessed tax under pro-
' 540 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 97 S. Ct. 1104 (1977).
" One bequest of $25,000 was made to the Grove Cemetery Association, and
another bequest, of half of the residual estate was made to the Watertown Cemetery
Association. The latter bequest was valued at approximately 2.5 million dollars. Both
cemetery associations are non-profit organizations, governed by the N.Y. NOTTOR-
PROFIT CORI'. LAW, § 1401 (McKinney 1970), as amended (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
Since the Grove Cemetery Association did not join in the appeal, the Second Circuit
limited its discussion to the issues raised by the Watertown Cemetery Association. 540
F.2d at 582-84. This note refers primarily to the Watertown Cemetery Association, but
the principles discussed arc applicable to both Associations.
' Ruth Child was co-executor of the Haas estate and was co-plaintiff, along with
the National Bank of Northern New York. Mrs. Child died during the pendency of the
suit, leaving the bank as sole executor. The Watertown Cemetery Association also joined
as co-plaintiff' in the suit, 540 F,2d at 580-81 & n, 1. An unsuccessful petition for cer-
tiorari was filed with the Supreme Court, under the name National Bank of Northern
New York v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1104 (1977).
I,R.C. 2055(a)(2) provides, in its relevant parts, for deductions from the value
of the gross estate for bequests:
to or for the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes ... no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private stock-
holder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of' which is carry-
ing on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and
which does not participate in, or intervene in ... any political campaign on
behalf' of any candidate for public office ....
540 F.2d at 581.
I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2). The executor also claimed that the cemetery associations
qualified as religious organizations. 540 F.2d at 581. The claim was based on the fact
that religious services were conducted in the burial process, and that burial itself is a re-
ligious activity. The district court dismissed this claim, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. Id. at 584. A claim that conducting religious services in a cemetery makes the
cemetery corporation one organized for religious purposes has no support in authority,
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test and brought an action in the District Court of Northern New
York for recovery of the contested payments.'
The district court, in a trial without jury, held that bequests to
non-profit cemetery associations were not bequests to an organization
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, where
such cemetery associations sold their plots and services while making
no provision for special treatment of the poor. 9
 The district court as-
sumed that sale of cemetery plots was not ordinarily a charitable activ-
ity. 9
 Since the statute requires that organizations seeking tax benefits
as charitable organizations must be operated exclusively for charitable
purposes,'° the court reasoned that tax benefits could attach only
where the sale of cemetery plots was conducted in such a way as to
constitute a charitable activity, and concluded that in order to consti-
tute a charitable activity the sale of cemetery plots must be conducted
so as to benefit the poor." Because the cemetery associations did not
sell their plots so as to benefit the poor, the court concluded that they
were not organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes,
and thus were not eligible under applicable estate tax provisions as
deductible bequests.' 2
The executor's appeal to the Second Circuit was principally
grounded on the assertion that the cemetery associations assumed a
substantial governmental burden, and that this assumption qualified
as a "charitable purpose" which should be given favored tax status
under section 2055(a) of the Internal Revenue Code." The circuit
court rejected the appellant's assertion and, in a 2-1 decision, HELD:
A non-profit cemetery association, which sells burial plots and offers
perpetual care to the general public, but which does not provide ser-
vices either for free or for reduced rates to the poor, is not operated
for an exclusively charitable purpose within the meaning of the statute
and is, on its face, difficult to sustain. Even proprietary cemeteries and funeral chapels
which are operated for profit conduct such services, but could scarcely be regarded as
tax-exempt organizations. The executors' argument that burial is of itself religious is a
"claim better addressed to Congress than the courts." Id. at 584 n.9.
The asserted deficiency was $935,096.60. 540 F.2d at 581. For reasons not
stated in the case, $19,010.88 was refunded without contest by the Commissioner. Id. A
$2,000 bequest to the Grove Cemetery Association, for perpetual care of a cemetery
plot (not that of testator), was allowed as a deduction. Id. at n.2.
'Id. at 580-81. The district court opinion was not reported. Consequently all
references to that opinion will be based on the court of appeals statement of the lower
court's disposition.
Id. at 580-81.
' 0 1.R.C. § 2055(a)(2).
11
 540 F.2d at 580-81.
I2
13 1d. at 583. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 291.1 (McKinney) requires that towns maintain
any abandoned public cemeteries within their confines. The Attorney General of New
York has expressed the opinion that all cemeteries not presently endowed or controlled
by an existing board or corporate body, whether public or private, must be cared for by
the town. 1974 Op. ATM GEN. OF N.Y. 100. See also 23 Op. STATE COMPT. OF N.Y. 629
(1967).
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governing estate tax deductions.'"
The court based its holding on three conclusions of law. First,
the court concluded that cemetery associations are not charitable or-
ganizations per se." The court based this conclusion on the fact that
elsewhere in the Code, certain non-profit cemeteries are given favored
tax status independently of charitable organizations. Thus, the court
reasoned that Congress did not view cemeteries as ordinarily qualify-
ing as charitable organizations. Second, the court concluded that re-
lief of governmental burdens in and of itself does not constitute an
exclusively charitable purpose." The court regarded such a standard
as unduly broad and concluded that while relief of governmental
burdens was not a non-charitable activity, it was not a sufficient pur-
pose in and of itself to qualify the organization as one being operated
for an exclusively charitable purpose.' 8 Finally, the court concluded
that the cemetery's sale of burial plots must be done so as to provide a
benefit to the poor in order to constitute a valid charitable purpose."
Since there was no showing that the cemetery associations in question
provided any direct benefit to the poor by way of sale of plots or ser-
vices at reduced rates, the court of appeals upheld the district court's
reasoning and determined that the bequests were not deductible as
bequests to organizations organized and operated exclusively for
charitable purposes. 2 °
The dissent found three reasons for arguing that the cemetery
should be regarded as organized and operated exclusively for charita-
ble purposes. First, the dissent accepted the appellant's contention that
the relief of governmental burdens is an exclusively charitable pur-
pose, and further found that the appellant had shown a substantial re-
lief of the government's burden." Accordingly, the cemetery should
be considered to be organized and operated exclusively for charitable
purposes." Second, the dissent noted that under the law of charita-
ble trusts, a cemetery such as the Watertown Cemetery Association
would have been viewed as a legitimate object of a valid charitable
trust." The dissent argued that since the law of charitable trust offers
" 540 F.2d at 582-84.
" Id. at 582.
' 6 Id. I.R.C. § 170(c)(5) provides that cemetery associations may receive income
tax deductible bequests, and 501(c)(13) exempts such cemetery associations from in-
come tax.
" 540 F.2d at 583.
' 8 1d.
12 Id. It is, of course, true that the fact that an organization engages in any sub-
stantial non-charitable activity precludes a finding of "charitable purpose." See Better
Business Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945);
United States v. La Societe de Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 152 F.2d 243, 245 (9th Cir, 1945),
cert. dertied,327 U.S. 793 (1946).
'° 540 F.2d at 583.
21 540 F.2d at 585 (Anderson, J., dissenting),
22 Id. at 586 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
:3 Id. at 588 (Anderson, J., dissenting). See Storr Burying Ground Assn. v. North
Lane Cemetery Assn., 77 Conn. 83, 95, 58 A. 467, 469 (1904).
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a strong analogy when ascertaining whether a particular activity is
"charitable" for tax purposes, the cemetery organization should be
found to be charitable. Finally, the dissent noted that a cemetery
which performed exactly the same services as the Watertown Ceme-
tery Association, but which was owned by a church, would be eligible
for tax-deductible bequests, 24
 and that denial of that privilege to the
Watertown Cemetery Association constituted a denial of equal protec-
tion. 26
The significance of the Second Circuit's decision in Child rests
primarily in the court's refusal to regard relief of the burdens of gov-
ernment alone, at least where cemeteries are concerned, as a sufficient
charitable purpose to qualify for favored tax treatment. The decision
indicates that cemetery organizations seeking to establish charitable
organization status within the meaning of the Code because they re-
lieve governmental burdens, must also demonstrate that they offer
other substantial services of a more traditionally charitable nature. In
reaching this result, the Child court seems to go against a number of
related lines of cases, and to misinterpret others which seem clear on
their face.
This note will initially focus on the reading given the Code pro-
visions by the Child court, and suggest an alternative construction to
that advanced by the court. The note will then examine the Child
court's analysis of the appropriate requirements to be imposed on a
cemetery seeking tax benefits as a charitable organization by consider-
ing the validity of the court's conclusion that relief of poverty is de-
manded of a charitable cemetery, and its rejection of the relief of
governmental burdens theory. The note will then suggest a more flex-
ible standard indicated by recent case law, which standard both rejects
the relief of poverty requirement, and accepts the relief of govern-
mental burdens theory. Finally, the note will examine the validity of
the theory that cemeteries should, by analogy to the law of charitable
trusts, be viewed as charitable organizations. It will consider the re-
lationship between the analogizing process urged by the dissent, and
the more flexible view of charity taken by other courts. 26
24 540 F.2d at 588 (Anderson, J., dissenting). See Estate of Elizabeth Audenried,
26 T.C. 120 (1956).
25 540 F.2d at 588 (Anderson, J., dissenting). See note 29 infra.
1 " The note does not deal with several issues which, while involved in the case,
are not central to its disposition. First, the district court ruled that only the taxpayer
(i.e. the executor) had standing under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1) (1970) (granting jurisdic-
tion to the district courts to hear claims for refunds of taxes alleged to have been er-
roneously, illegally, or improperly collected) and accordingly the cemetery association
lacked standing to challenge the commissioner. 540 F.2d at 581 n.5. The Child court af-
firmed the district court decision on the merits, but did not reach the standing issue. Id.
Second, the dissent raised the issue that granting exempt status to cemeteries owned by
religious organizations, see Estate of Elizabeth Auden, 26 T.C. 120, 124-26 (1956), while
denying favored status to non-sectarian cemeteries of substantially identical descriptions,
is a violation of equal protection. 540 F.2d 588-90. The claim was not raised by appel-
lants. On the general issue of the constitutionality of tax advantages accorded religious
entities, see Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 672-80 (1970).
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I. THE CHILD COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The Child court construed the Code so as to preclude any claim
that cemeteries are per se charitable organizations." The court reached
this conclusion by means of independent statutory construction." The
court's statutory analysis focused on three sections which provide tax
benefits to charitable organizations: 29 (1) section 170, which specifies
those organizations to which taxpayers may make income-tax de-
Finally, the note does not deal with appellant's claim that I.R.C. § 2055(a)(3)
should govern the disposition of the bequest. 540 F.2d at 581 n.4. That section provides
that a bequest may be deductible if it is "to a trustee or trustees ... if such contributions
or gifts are to be used by such trustee or trustees ... exclusively for religious, charita-
ble, scientific, literary, or educational purposes ...." Appellant claimed and the dissent
agreed that if bequests were used exclusively for charitable purposes, it would not mat-
ter that the cemetery association itself was not exclusively charitable. 540 F.2d at 590.
The Child court disposed of this claim by noting that "the upkeep of a cemetery which
does not have an exclusively charitable purpose cannot be said to be an exclusively
charitable function." Id. It appears that the purpose of the statute is to allow a non-
charitable organization (e.g. a business corporation) to serve as a trustee of a charitable
trust fund without endangering the deductible nature of any bequest made to the lurid.
In fact, the original language of this provision, dating from the Revenue Act of 1918,
40 Stat. 1057, provides for deductibility of bequests for exclusively charitable purposes,
or to trustees, if such bequests were used "exclusively for such ... charitable ... pur-
poses." 40 Stat. 1098. The presence of the word "such" suggests that the initial purpose
of the provision was to require that the same "charitable purposes" be pursued regard-
less of whether the recipient of the bequest took the gift outright or took only legal ti-
tle. Thus, the Cemetery Association could serve as trustee of a fund designed to pay
for, e.g., the burial of poor people. The fact that the cemetery association was not
deemed to be exclusively charitable in its purposes would not affect the deductibility of
the bequest in trust. On the other hand, a bequest to a cemetery association which was
not deemed charitable, to be used for the maintenance of the non-charitable cemetery,
would not be a deductible bequest. It is submitted, therefore, that this issue was cor-
rectly determined by the Child court, if one accepts the conclusion that the cemetery was
not itself operated for an "exclusively charitable purpose."
27 540 F.2d at 582.
2U Id.
2° The three sections discussed in this note (sections 501(0(3), 170(0(2)(3) and
2055(a)(2)) all contain substantially identical formulations in granting favored status to
"charitable organizations." It does not appear to have been squarely held that the word
charitable is to be given the same effect in all three sections, so it cannot be firmly
stated that this is the law. Several factors, however, strongly urge such an assumption.
First, the Treasury Regulations contain only one section construing the words "charita-
ble purpose." Treas. Reg, 1-501 (c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1960) (applies specifically to section 501).
There are no separate regulations construing "charitable" in the other pertinent Code
sections. Further, no court has ever, to this writer's knowledge, attempted to assert that
the meaning of the word charitable varies from section to section of the Code. Courts
routinely cite to cases construing "charitable" in connection with provisions not at issue
in the case at hand. See, e,g., United States v, Proprietors of Social Law Library, 102
F.2d 481, 481 (2d Cir. 1938) (a capital stock tax case), citing the definition of "charita-
ble" found in St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Burnet, 59 F.2d 922, 927 (3d Cir. 1932) (an
estate tax case). Finally, to impose a different standard on various sections would create
a wholly unnecessary administrative problem.
For purposes of this article, it will be assumed that the word "charitable" has a
consistent meaning within the three relevant sections. It is worth noting that with re-
spect to the Child case this proposition appears to have been acknowledged by the Trea-
sury Department in its brief. 540 F.2d at 586.
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ductible contributions; 30 (2) section 501(c) which specifies those or-
ganizations which are themselves exempt from income tax liability; 3 '
and, (3) section 2055(a)(2), which allows for deductions from the gross
estate of bequests to certain organizations for estate tax purposes. 32
All three sections contain a general exemption, phrased in virtually
identical language, for organizations "organized and operated exclu-
sively for ... charitable ... purposes," 33 and which pass certain or-
ganizational tests.
Both sections 170(c) and 501(c) contain specific provisions for
cemeteries operated for the benefit of their members, and not oper-
ated for profit. 34
 These provisions were viewed on their face by the
Child court as indicating a congressional view that such cemeteries
could not qualify as charitable cemeteries on a per se basis." The court
noted that when the Code was revised in 1954, Congress added sec-
tion 170(c)(5), which allowed contributions to non-profit cemeteries to
be deductible for income tax purposes, but did not extend this benefit
to bequests to non-profit cemeteries." Since special treatment was
needed in order to assure that non-profit cemeteries receive tax
benefits, the court reasoned that the Code thus clearly indicates that
Congress did not regard such cemeteries as charitable organizations.
Consequently, the court concluded that non-profit cemeteries are not
charitable organizations under the Code, on a per se basis. 37
" I.R.C. § 170(a) and (b) provide that, within certain limits, taxpayers may de-
duct from gross income the amount of any transfers to charity.
31
 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The section recites the same organizational restrictions with
respect to lobbying and political activity named in section 2055(a)(2), supra note 4.
33 I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2), supra note 4.
33 I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2), 501(c)(3) and 2055(a)(2).
34 1.R,C, § 170(c)(5) provides that contributions to non-profit cemetery associa-
tions "operated exclusively for the benefit of their members" are deductible from gross
income. 1.R.C. § 501(c)(13), which grants such cemeteries exempt status,- is identical, ex-
cept that it further provides that cremation socieities are tax exempt.
33
 540 F.2d at 582.
se Id.
" Id. The history of sections 170(c), 501(c), and 2055(a) is somewhat complex.
The Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 403, 39 Stat. 756, made no provision for deductions of
charitable contributions for income tax purposes, but did exempt certain organizations,
including charitable ones, from income tax liability. Id. § 11, 39 Stat. 756. The Act did
not allow for the deduction of charitable bequests for estate tax purposes. Id. 203, 39
Stat. 77.
In the Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, Congress revised the Code to
allow for deductions for income tax purposes for contributions made to "... corpora-
tions or associations organized exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educa-
tional purposes ...." 1201, 40 Stat. 330. In the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40
Stat. 1057, a similar provision was passed favoring charitable bequests, which became
deductible for estate tax purposes. Id., § 403(b)(c), 40 Stat. 1099.
From an early date, cemeteries have received special treatment in the income tax
sections of the Code. The Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 464, 39 Stat. 750, specified that
"cemetery companfies] owned and operated exclusively for the benefit of [their] mem-
bers" are not liable for income tax. Id. at § 11(a) Fifth. Thus, even though the 1916 Act
provided an exemption from income tax liability for "charitable organizations," Rev-
enue Act of 1916, ch. 136, 39 Stat. 227, Congress also included a specific exemption for
960
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While the Child court viewed the specific statutory treatment of a
certain class of cemeteries as indicative of their exclusion from the
charitable organization category, the court did not face the question of
what cemeteries in fact are described by sections 501(c)(13) and
170(c)(5). If Congress made special provision for such cemeteries be-
cause it did not regard them as otherwise eligible for favored status as
"charitable organizations," it follows that such provisions describe ac-
curately Congress' concept of a non-charitable cemetery. Thus the
first step in a proper analysis of the Code provisions should be a con-
sideration of what kinds of cemeteries Congress described as being
non-charitable.
Section 170(c)(5) which makes contributions to cemetery organi-
zations deductible for income tax purposes was added to the Code in
1954. It was modeled word for word after section 501(c)(13). Sections
501(c)(13) and 170(c)(5) were identical until 1970 when section
501(c)(13) was expanded to provide exempt status for cremation and
burial societies. 38 It can safely be assumed that in applying identical
language to income tax deductions for contributions to cemeteries as
is used to exempt those cemeteries from income taxation, Congress
meant to give special treatment to the same class of cemeteries that it
cemeteries. The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, expanded the exemption to
include non-profit cemeteries, and added certain organizational requirements, giving
the exemption the language it retained in the present Code in § 501(c)(13) until 1970:
Cemetery companies owned and operated exclusively for the benefit of
their members or which are not operated for profit; and any corporation
chartered solely for burial purposes as a cemetery corporation and not
permitted by its charter to engage in any business not necessarily incident
to that purpose, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private stockholder or individual ....
42 Stat. 254. The Child court indicates that the exemption from income tax for
cemeteries dates from 1954. 540 F.2d at 581. This is erroneous. An exemption from in-
come tax for certain cemeteries has been in the Code since 1916, and a provision sub-
stantially identical to section 501(c)(13) has been in the Code since 1921.
The most perplexing part of the Code treatment accorded to cemeteries, how-
ever, is the 1954 amendment of section 170(c)(5). The amendment included a provision
allowing deductions from income tax of transfers to cemetery associations in language
virtually identical to that in section 501(c)(13). There was, however, no amendment to
section 2055(a). Thus, the anomalous result in that inter vivos transfers made to ceme-
tery associations are specifically favored over testamentary bequests. As a result of this
peculiar arrangement, a bequest to maintain a nun-profit, but non-charitable cemetery
would not be deductible fur estate tax purposes. On the other hand, a trust set up to
pay income to the same cemetery would be able to deduct, subject to other limits in sec-
tion 170, the income paid to the cemetery, for purposes of computing the income tax
due on the trust. -
3B Pub. L. 91-618, 84 Stat. 1855. It is interesting to speculate whether the Child
court would attach a similar significance to the amendment of section 501(c)(13) so as to
allow cremation societies to be tax exethpt, without similarly amending section 170(c)(5).
Does such a legislative action indicate a congressional judgment that cremation societies
are not, in the ordinary course, subsumed by the term "any corporation chartered solely
for burial purposes ...." It is at least as likely that special mention by Congress reflects
a congressional desire to preclude any doubt as to the treatment to be accorded an or-
ganization, as it is that such special and separate mention reflects a congressional
judgment that the specially mentioned class is not subsumed in some broader term.
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had already exempted from income tax. Thus the relevant inquiry be-
comes what kinds of cemeteries does section 501(c)(13) describe which
must presumptively be non-charitable.
The first step of an analysis of section 501(0(13) is to examine
the purpose served by that section in its statutory context. Section
50I(c)(13) appears as part of a series of provisions exempting certain
organizations from taxation which are generally of a cooperative and
mutual nature," local in character, and characterized by the fact that
their members are the beneficiaries of the organizations' efforts."
These organizations include, inter alia, mutual ditch or irrigation com-
panies," local teacher retirement funds,42 and small credit unions."
The tax policy underlying these provisions appears to be to encourage
self-help through mutual or cooperative effort in several areas. 44 They
are not "charitable" per se because the members are the beneficiaries
of their activities. 45 Similarly, a small, private, family cemetery, 4 °
which is non-profit would be exempt under section 501(c)(13) but ap-
parently would not be charitable since there is no benefit to the gen-
eral public. 47 The essential characteristic of the non-charitable ceme-
tery, then, is that it is not organized to benefit the general public, but
rather is organized to benefit its members.
The next point of inquiry focuses on Congress' decision to ex-
tend favored status to this same class of cemeteries with respect to in-
come tax deductible contributions, but not with respect to bequests.
The most logical explanation for this different treatment is that Con-
gress wished to encourage disinterested support of cooperative ceme-
tery associations, which primarily benefited their members, but was
concerned that bequests to such cemeteries, especially small family
cemeteries, could be disguised bequests for self-memorialization."
Clearly, it is extremely difficult to determine the disinterestedness of a
3g New Jersey Automobile Club v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 259, 261 (1960).
" John D. Rockefeller Family Cemetery Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 355, 363
(1974).
" C.R.C. § 501(c)(12).
42 I.R.C. § 501(c)(1 1).
4"
	 § 501(c)(14). Other organizations exempted are certain mutual insurance
companies, § 501(c)(15); mutual crop financing corporations, § 501(c)(16); and pro-
fessional football leagues, § 501(c)(6).
44 John D. Rockefeller Family Cemetery Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 355, 363
(1974).
"Id. The Rockefeller court stressed that while these organizations may "do much
to enhance the public good," they are private organizations concerned with serving the
good of the members. Id.
" Id. at 363.
"Id. The court specifically rejected the Commissioner's claim that the organiza-
tions in sections 501(c)(9)-(13) were "quasi-charitable" or concerned with the public wel-
fare. Id.
4g
 It should be noted that a transer in the form of a gift, for which favored status
is claimed under section 170(c)(5), is considered a payment for consideration, and hence
not deductible, if the gift is in return for a promise of perpetual care. Wood v. Com-
missioner, 39 T.C. I, 7 (1962).
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bequest to a cemetery in which testator is to be buried. If, however,
questions concerning the purity of the donor's motive arise where a
deduction from income tax is claimed, the taxpayer is still available to
be examined on this subject. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume
that Congress intended to exclude from section 2055(a) those
cemeteries which, because they are small and often family run, would
be likely to abuse gifts for general cemetery maintenance by erecting
individual monuments with the funds.
The third question posed by the statutes is whether the fact that
sections 50l (c)(13) and 170(c)(5) describe many large, public, non-
profit cemeteries, means that such cemeteries could not otherwise
qualify as charitable organizations. The Child court found that such
cemeteries could be charitable only if they provided free or low cost
burial space to indigents. 49 It appears, however, that the position of
section 501(c)(13) in the Code, and its explicit language, limit its effect
to those companies operated for "the benefit of [their] members," 5 "
and which, of necessity could not be charitable. Section 501(c)(13) says
nothing more, in effect, than that cemetery companies whose
beneficiaries are not the public at large are tax-exempt even though
they are not charitable. In sum, Congress appears to have viewed only
those cemeteries whose members are the primary beneficiaries of the
cemetery association as requiring special mention in order to receive
certain tax benefits.
The logical inference to be drawn from this is that Congress did
view cemeteries which provide benefits primarily to the public as
being charitable. Where the public, not the individual cemetery associ-
ation members, is the beneficiary of the cemetery's efforts, the statutes
indicate, by negative inference, that there is no need for special
statutory attention in order to make the cemetery eligible for tax
benefits as a charitable organization. For this reason, it appears that
the Child court's summary assumption that cemeteries are not charita-
ble per se represents an inadequate analysis of the tax treatment of
cemeteries, and that a correct reading of the statutes would have led
to the conclusion that cemeteries offering substantial benefits to the
public are charitable for tax purposes. 5 '
49 540 F.2d at 583.
" I.R.C. § 501(c)(13).
"The Child court was not alone in concluding that tax favors specifically ac-
corded cemeteries reflects a legislative judgment that they are not ordinarily charitable
organizations. Many state courts have come to the same conclusion. In Hill's Estate, 131
Me. 211, 160 A. 946 (1932), the court regarded a statute authorizing organization of
cemetery corporations in the same manner governing charitable corporations as reflect-
ing a legislative decision not to regard cemeteries as charities under the tax statutes. 131
Me. at 213-14, 160 A. at 947. In Christgaun v. Woodlawn Cemetery Ass'n, 208 Minn.
263, 268, 293 N.W. 619, 621 (1940), the court specifically rejected the contention that
the common law of charitable trusts, which regarded cemetery trusts generally as
charitable, was applicable. It concluded that a cemetery association was not exempt
from unemployment compensation tax as a charitable organization, 208 Minn. at 267,
133 N.W. at 621. In Milford v. Commissioner, 213 Mass. 162, 100 N.E. 60 (1912), the
court acknowledged that cemeteries afford a general public benefit, but argued that
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II. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A CHARITABLE CEMETERY
A. Relief of Poverty Theory
The Child court, having concluded that the statutes do not regard
cemeteries as charitable organizations per se, then turned to a considera-
tion of what requirements were imposed upon cemeteries seeking to
qualify as charitable organizations for tax purposes.
The court framed its analysis by assuming that a cemetery could
be organized so as to qualify as a charitable organization. 52 The court
then relied on the case of Gund's Estate v. Commissioner 53 to determine
what standards applied. In Gund, an executor claimed that under the
predecessor to section 2055 54 a bequest to a cemetery was deductible
from the gross estate as a bequest to a charitable organization. The
Gund court pointed out that while "[a] cemetery association doubtless
could be so organized and operated as to be a charitable organiza-
tion,"55 the failure of the cemetery to provide free or low cost burial
services to the poor precluded the taxpayer from deducting the be-
quest to the cemetery association." The Child court found this re-
quirement to be sound, and quoted with approval Schuster v. Nichols,"
upon which Gund relied, and from which Gund quoted extensively."
In Schuster, the court rejected a claim that a cemetery was a charitable
institution and expressly concluded that the tax codes use the word
"charitable" in its "more narrow and restricted sense, as signifying
those corporations which were organized and maintained exclusively
for elemosynary purposes."59
In addition to concluding that both Gund and Schuster require
that a charitable cemetery carry a rate structure related to ability to
pay, the Child court further cited Bank of Carthage v. United States 6° in
where cemeteries were specifically exempted from one kind of taxation, they could not
be exempted as charitable organizations for other taxes. The court indicated that no
cemetery, no matter how charitably organized, could qualify as a charitable organization
unless specifically mentioned, if it were singled out elsewhere. Id. at 165, 100 N.E. at
62. See also Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc. v. Lawlor, 56 N.J. 326, 332, 266 A.2d 569,
572 (1970).
52
 540 F.2d at 582.
53
 1 i3 F.2d 61 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 696 (1940).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812, 53 Stat. 123 (now I.R.C. § 2055).
33
 113 F.2d at 62.
"Id. The Gund court also stressed the special statutory treatment accorded
cemeteries. Id. The court quoted with approval the Board of Tax Appeals' observation
in Craig v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 193, 200 (1928), that "from the first revenue act to
the last, Congress has consistently and persistently placed charitable ... institutions in
one class and cemeteries not operated for gain in a distinct and separate class We
should not join together classes which Congress has seen fit to put asunder." Id., quoted at
113 F.2d at 63.
52 20 F.2d 179 (D.C. Mass. 1927).
58 Well over one third of the opinion in Gund is simply a direct quote from
Schuster, 113 F.2d at 62-63.
59 20 F.2d at 180, quoted in Child, 540 F.2d at 583 n.7.
°° 304 F. Supp. 77 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
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support of the proposition that a charitable cemetery must accord a
direct benefit only to the poor. In Bank of Carthage, a cemetery which
had been created to offer burial service at a lower price than that
charged by the other cemetery in town, was nevertheless denied
charitable status, because "the rich the poor and the inbetween" paid
the same fees for burial in the cemetery." The Child court viewed
Gund, Schuster, and Bank of Carthage together as mandating that
cemeteries claiming charitable status benefit the poor directly. With
little independent analysis of the reasoning of these cases, the court
accepted this conclusion as applicable to the facts in Child.
The Child court's application of the Gund "relief of poverty stan-
dard" is not a satisfactory approach to the problem raised by the case.
First, the case law cited by the court is neither persuasive nor apposite
to the facts of Child. In Bank of Carthage, the executor sought to
establish that the cemetery was charitable on the grounds that it did
relieve poverty. The cemetery had been organized to provide burials
at a rate lower than those charged by the other cemetery in town."
The question in Bank of Carthage was limited to whether or not lower
burial rates constituted relief of poverty. Unlike Child, Bank of Carthage
did not pose the question whether relief of poverty was the sole
grounds upon which a cemetery could be found to be charitable.
Thus, the Child court's use of the case to support the proposition that
a charitable cemetery must relieve poverty was inappropriate.
Similarly, the court's reliance on Gund and Schuster for its narrow
definition of "charitable" as applied to cemeteries is misplaced.
Schuster, upon which Gund's conclusion relies almost in whole, was de-
cided before the courts generally adopted the policy of giving exempt-
ing statutes a liberal construction." Indeed Schuster explicitly adopted
°' Id. at 80.
62 Id.
63 The federal courts, as a matter of judicial policy, generally favor a liberal con-
struction of the exempting statutes. The policy applies, most frequently, where technical
problems might otherwise prevent a gift from being deductible, or an organization
from being accorded exempt status. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
301 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (charitable contributions paid from trust fund authorized, but
not expressly directed by trust instrument, held deductible for income tax purposes);
Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934) (taxpayer allowed to deduct charitable
contributions based on percentage of net income, rather than "ordinary net income");
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (incidental non-charitable ac-
tivities engaged in in pursuit of charitable goals did not violate the "exclusivity" re-
quirement of the exemption for charitable organizations); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Burnet, 59 F.2d 922, 927 (3d Cir. 1932) (bequest in trust to a church which would re-
vert if the church failed to collect double the trust income from its own sources for two
consecutive years during the trust's 10 year life was deductible, though contingent);
Beggs v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 599, 606 (1939) (bequest in trust for the benefit of
such charities as executor in consultation with testator's sister deemed worthy, held de-
ductible although specific charitable purposes not specified). The courts' desire to pre-
vent.technical matters from frustrating charitable activity is expressed by Judge Hand in
Slocum v. Bowers, 15 F.2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1926): "The policy of exempting these [i.e.
charitable] corporations is firmly established .... The statute should be read, if possi-
ble, in such a way as to carry out this policy and not to make the result turn on acciden-
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a narrow construction policy in reaching its conclusion." Thus, while
Gund may have been precisely on point factually, its age, its reliance
on Schuster, and its lack of careful analysis of the statutes or the tax
policy issues involved make its value as authority questionable. Since
neither Gund nor Bank of Carthage represent substantial authority on
the issues presented in Child, the Child court's acceptance of the cases
as controlling precedent is unsound.
B. Relief of Governmental Burden Theory
By accepting the Gund relief of poverty test, the Child court im-
plicitly rejected an alternative analytical framework offered by a
number of pertinent cases." This alternative analytical framework,
the relief of governmental burdens theory, focuses on the degree of
general public benefit provided by the organization and seeks to de-
termine whether such benefit is substantial enough to warrant accord-
ing tax benefits to the organization. This standard was urged on the
Child court by appellants," who pointed out that burial of the dead
was an activity which would fall to the government as a public health
matter were there no private agencies willing to undertake the task. 67
They further argued that the duty to maintain existing cemetery
grounds, whether or not presently used for burial, would fall to the .
county and local government, if there were no functioning board of
trustees or governors which could accept responsibility for care of the
cemetery." Appellants urged that such relief of governmental bur-
dens had been recognized by the courts as a "charitable purpose," and
that exclusive dedication to such purposes had been held to be
grounds for granting charitable status." Appellants noted that the
Treasury Regulation interpreting section 501(c)(3) specifically rec-
ognized that lessening the burdens of government was a purpose to
which an "exclusively charitable" organization could be dedicated."
In advancing the relief of governmental burdens theory, appel-
lants relied heavily on the Second Circuit decision in Dulles v.
Johnson,n which involved allegedly deductible bequests for the benefit
of various bar associations in New York. 72 In Dulles, the court of ap-
tal circumstances or legal technicalities." Id. at 403. The policy is consistent with judicial
recognition that the statutes should be administered so as to encourage the type of
charitable giving which relieves Congress of certain burdens.
" 20 F.2d at 180.
" See text and notes at notes 87-100 infra.
66 Brief for Appellant at 9.
67 Id. at 10.
68 Id. at 10. See note 16 supra.
69
 Brief for Appellant at 11.
7° Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1960) provides in part "(2) Charitable de-
fined:	 . such term includes ... lessening the burdens of Government ...."
71 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960).
"Id. at 363. The beneficiaries under the will were The New York County
Lawyers Association, The New York State Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, The William Nelson Cromwell Foundation for Research of the
966
NOTES
peals noted that "[Of [the regulation of the unauthorized practice of
law was] not undertaken by the Associations, the cost of this necessary
regulation would descend upon the public. Hence, we conclude as to
regulation of the unauthorized practice of law, the associations must
be deemed 'charitable.' "73 Applying this rationale to cemeteries, ap-
pellant argued, mandates the result that those cemeteries which as-
sume burdens which would otherwise devolve upon the public must
be regarded as charitable organizations for tax purposes."
The Child court rejected the appellants' argument by asserting
that Dulles did not stand for the proposition that relief of govern-
mental burdens will always constitute a sufficient charitable purpose to
enable the organizations to qualify under the tax codes." Instead, the
Child court reasoned that Dulles held that "public dedication of ser-
vices by an organization may be colored by a history of that organiza-
tion's performance of more traditional charitable activities to such an
extent that the entire enterprise, or the 'total operations' of the associ-
ation assume the aspect of charitable services to the community.""
The Child court thus appears to have read Dulles as allowing an or-
ganization which performs substantial "traditionarcharitable activities
to qualify for favored status where otherwise non-charitable activity
relieves the burdens of government." This treatment, in effect, re-
gards relief of governmental burdens as an exception to the rule that
any substantial performance of non-charitable activity causes an or-
ganization to forfeit any claim to exempt status.'" In other words, ac-
cording to this reading of Dulles, relief of the burdens of government
is an acceptable quasi-charitable activity but this activity, in and of it-
self, does not enable an organization to qualify per se as an exclusively
charitable organization." The court then distinguished Dulles by not-
ing that the cemetery association in Child conducted no such "tradi-
tional" charitable activities to entitle it to qualify as an exclusively
charitable organization.
It is submitted that the Child court's reading of Dulles is contrary
to the explicit language of that case. The Dulles court's conclusion is
Law and Legal History of the Colonial Period of the United States, and the Alumni As-
sociation of the School of Law of Columbia University. The appeal concerned the
charitable status of the three bar associations.
73
 id. at 366.
" Brief for Appellant at 11.
75
 540 F.2d at 589.
" Id.
"Id.
79 See note 21 supra.
79 In this respect, it is worth noting that the Child court believed that relief of the
public Ilse was:
more symptomatic than evidentiary regarding whether an activity is chari-
table: charity often results in an absorption of a burden otherwise falling
upon the state, particularly where the social welfare is a principle purpose
of the state. But this does not mean that activities in any of a myriad of
areas of public interest are perforce charitable.
Id.
967
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
unambiguous. Recognizing the fact that regulation of the un-
authorized practice of law would of necessity be undertaken by the
government in the absence of the Bar Association's activities, the court
declared accordingly that "the Association must be deemed 'charita-
ble.' " 80
 There is no basis in the opinion for the Child court's view that
public service is not in itself a "charitable purpose" within the Code.
Rather, the Dulles court recognized what the appellant in Child con-
tended: that relief of the burdens of government in and of itself may
constitute a "charitable purpose" under the Code.
The Child court offered no justification for its reading of Dulles,
beyond noting that many organizations provide some relief of gov-
ernment burdens as a consequence of their activities, and that all such
organizations could not be regarded as charitable organizations," The
court appeared concerned that following Dulles would result in a
"myriad" of claims by organizations arguing that their activities in
some way relieve a governmental burden. Under Dulles, however, an
organization must still show that such relief is, in effect, its raison d'etre
in order to obtain the tax benefits flowing to a charitable institution.
The fact that relief flows incidentally from its activities would not have
been sufficient under Dulles to warrant granting tax relief. The Child
court, then, appears to have confused the fact that many organizations
can no doubt show some absorption of a burden otherwise belonging
to the state with the fact that such organizations would not qualify for
tax relief without a showing that such relief is the organization's ex-
clusive purpose. The Child court's conclusion that relief of the public
fisc is often a "symptom" of charitable activity, rather than evidence of
such activity82
 assumes erroneously that it cannot be both. Clearly, a
private social welfare agency reduces the burden on the state welfare
mechanism, but such an agency would qualify as a charitable organiza-
tion on the basis of its relief of the burdens of poverty. This is no re-
ason to conclude that in other cases where an organization's activity
cannot be described as relieving poverty, that the relief thereby af-
forded the public does not in and of itself constitute a charitable pur-
pose. On the contrary, the clear holding of Dulles is that such public
service is a charitable purpose thus qualifying the organization for fa-
vored tax status under the Code. Thus, the Child court mistakenly in-
terpreted Dulles and accordingly mistakenly concluded that relief of
governmental burdens did not qualify as an exclusively charitable
purpose under the Code.
III. PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
By accepting the Gund relief of poverty test for determining
whether an organization is operated for an exclusively charitable pur-
g° 273 F.2d at 366.
g' 540 F.2d at 583.
"Id.
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pose, the Child court, as noted previously, implicitly rejected a consis-
tent line of cases which has taken a much broader view of the scope of
charitable purpose. This broader view treats as "charitable" all organi-
zations whose primary purpose is to benefit the public or relieve gov-
ernmental burdens." It is submitted that this broader view of "charit-
able purpose," recognizing both public benefit and relief of govern-
mental burdens, is sound and should be adopted by courts in the fu-
'ture in preference to the more restrictive relief of poverty standard
espoused by the Child court.
The rationale underlying tax favors for charities which adopts
the relief' of public burdens standard is widely accepted in case law.
Some cases adopting this standard specifically recognize a shifting of
burdens from the government to the charitable organizations as the
rationale for charitable deductions. Typical of these cases is Duffy v.
Birmingham," where the Eighth Circuit, in construing "charitable pur-
pose" in connection with an allegedly charitable bequest, observed:
the common element of charitable purposes within the
meaning of the section [predecessor to 2055(a)] is the relief
of the public of a burden which would otherwise belong to
it. Charitable purposes are those which benefit the commun-
ity by relieving it pro tanto from an obligation which it
owes to the objects of charity as members of the commun-
ity."
Similarly, Judge Bazelon, in McClown v. Connally., a District of' Col-
umbia district court case which held that certain tax-benefits accorded
racially exclusive organizations were unconstitutional and in violation
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, wrote that the rationale for allowing the
deduction of charitable contributions is that "by doing so, the Gov-
ernment relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in
the absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the
govern me nt.""
The view that charitable contribution deductions are based on
Congress' desire to encourage private absorption of public burdens
was also recognized by the Court of Claims in Founding Church of Sci-
entology v. United States." In denying tax-exempt status to the taxpayer
on the grounds that significant amounts of its income benefited in-
dividuals, the Court of Claims observed:
Implicit in section 501 is the recognition that certain in-
as See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197,
1201 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Duffy v. Birmingham, 190 F.2d 738, 741 (8th Cir. 1951); McGlot-
ten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 452 (D.D.C. 1972); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150, 1158 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom., Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
"" 190 F.2d 738, 741 (8th Cir. 1951).
" Id.
"338 F. Supp. 448, 452 (D.D.C. 1972).
" Id.
"" 412 F.2d 1197, 1201 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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stitutions and organizations exist and function for purposes
which Congress deems beneficial to society as a whole. In
order to foster these aims, funds which would otherwise be
acquired and expended for the public good by the Gov-
ernment are left by Congress in the hands of these organi-
zations."
This position was affirmed in Green v. Connally," another District of
Columbia district court case, where the court, in denying exempt
status to a racially exclusive school, noted that relief of poverty is not
the only meaning accorded charity in the Code."'
Perhaps the most persuasive articulation of this position is found
in the court of appeals opinion in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization v. Simon." In that case, the Treasury Department was held
to have properly promulgated a Revenue Ruling which granted tax
exempt status to non-profit hospitals which, while not providing free
or low-cost care to the poor, accepted all patients able to pay directly
or by third party reimbursement, and maintained a twenty-four hour
a day emergency room."3
 The court of appeals, in reaching its conclu-
sion that Rev. Rule 69-545 was not inconsistent with section 501(c)(3),
noted that "the term 'charitable' is ... capable of a definition far
broader than merely the relief of the poor."'" While not expressly
adopting the language of relief of governmental burdens, the court's
analysis thus focused on the same underlying issue — i.e. whether the
activity is one which provides substantial benefits to the community
which would otherwise be provided either by the government,
a"
Pi' 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (D.D.C.), affd mem. sub nom.. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S.
997 (1971).
"Id.
' 2 506 F.2d 1278, 1287-90 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated for lack of standing, 426 U.S.
26 (1976).
"Id.
" 4 /d. The court also noted the language in the Treasury Regulations exempting
organizations which relieve the burdens of government from income tax. Treas. Regs.
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1960) provides:
(2) Charitable defined. The term 'charitable' is used in section
501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be
construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of
other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outline of
'charity' as developed by judicial decisions. Such term includes: Relief of
the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of reli-
gion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Gov-
ernment; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to ac-
complish such purposes.
The Regulations enumerate as "charitable purposes" several additional purposes: ad-
vancement of religion, education and science, the relief of poverty, and the erection of
public works. The Regulations go on to list a number of purposes which appear to be
an enumeration of other purposes of general social benefit. These purposes include:
defense of human rights, elimination of neighborhood tensions, racial discrimination
and delinquency, and significantly, lessening the burdens of government. While the
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through tax levies, or not at all." Noting that few hospitals actually
provide any significant direct philanthropy anymore, since indigents
are usually cared for at state expense, 96 the court reasoned that del=
initions of charitable which are restricted to relief of poverty are too
limited and fail "to recognize the changing• economic, social and
technological precepts and values of contemporary society." 97
The Eastern Kentucky court thus developed a definition of
"charitable purpose" that gives the term a meaning consonant with the
needs of a community at a given time. Such a standard is more realis-
tic than the narrow relief of poverty standard employed in Child, for it
recognizes that society may be served in many ways which do not di-
rectly relieve poverty, and that such services may be indispensable and
worthy of subsidization through tax benefits. Indeed it seems only
reasonable to view the needs of a community at a given time, in con-
sidering the social value of an organization. For example, an organiza-
tion which has as its chief goal promotion of harmonious race re-
lations in a racially troubled city may provide no relief of poverty, but
clearly serves a vital purpose to that city, and, significantly, may well
perform services which the government cannot perform." Such an
organization is charitable not to the extent that it relieves poverty, but
to the extent that it serves the public.
The soundness of the public benefit and relief of government
burdens standard is further supported by cases which urge that the
common law of charitable trusts provides a useful interpretive tool in
determining whether a particular activity is charitable for tax pur-
poses." These cases suggest that if a particular purpose were deemed
charitable for purposes of trust law, that purpose should also be
charitable under tax statutes favoring charitable activity.m
It is appropriate for courts confronting claims for the tax
benefits accorded charities to analogize to the factual determination
and the analytical process used by courts in charitable trust cases be-
cause in both situations a determination of charitable status produces
Regulations may be found by courts to overstep the statutory mandate, the regulation
in issue specifically purports to recapitulate judicial descriptions of "charitable pur-
poses" and to apply them broadly to the Code. In short, the Regulations purport to fol-
low prior judicial policy, not to dictate it. Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that
the Regulations themselves adopt a view that "charity" is any activity primarily designed
to benefit the public, or relieve the burdens of government.
95 506 F.2d at 1291.
"° Id. at 1290.
" 7 Id. While Eastern Kentucky cannot be viewed as binding precedent in view of the
Supreme Court's vacation of the decision for lack of standing, it is, nevertheless, con-
sonant with the decisions in Green and McGlotten, supra at notes 91-92, 95-96, and pre-
sumably reflects the policy, if not the express law of the District of Columbia Circuit.
95 In fact, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1960) expressly exempts such organi-
zations from income tax. See note 94 supra.
"See note III infra.
'°° Id. A charitable trust is simply a trust without an ascertainable beneficiary
which is nevertheless enforceable in equity as being beneficial to the public generally. J.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1018 (5th edition, S. Symons, ed., 1941) (hereinafter
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certain inevitable social losses.'°' A charitable trust is immune to the
operation of the rule against perpetuities, hence taking property out
of circulation.'" Similarly, allowance of a charitable deduction de-
prives the state of revenues. Thus in both cases, a determination of
"charitable purpose" involves a result contrary to well established so-
cial policies — the free alienation of property on the one hand, and
the collection of needed revenue on the other. Since in both trust and
tax cases a finding of "charitable purpose" entails certain social de-
triments, the longstanding recognition in trust cases of the wisdom of
weighing these detriments against the social benefits provided by the
activity persuasively recommends adoption of the same process in tax
cases, where the courts face a similar dilemma.
A court considering the validity of a bequest which allegedly
constitutes a common law charitable trust must determine to what ex-
tent the community is served by according the bequest the special
status of a charitable trust, not simply whether or not it relieves the
burdens of poverty.'" The process used by courts in cases where the
POMEROY). See Bayer v. Myers, 244 F. 902, 911-12 (8th Cir. 1917). While it appears that
charitable uses were enforced in England prior to the Statute of Elizabeth (93 Eliz. c.4),
that Statute, which gave Chancery a remedy to enforce certain types of trusts, marks
the beginning of a long history of judicial development of the requirements which must
be met if a trust is to be enforceable as a charitable trust. 4 POMEROY § 1028. it is well
settled that charitable trust purposes may not be illegal, or contrary to public policy.
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1 159 (D.D.C.), affd mem. 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
Furthermore, the trust's purpose must be "charitable." Id. See generally IV A. Scum. .
THE LAw OF TRUSTS, § 377 (3d ed. 1967) (hereinafter Scorr); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 377, Comment (c) (1957). The purposes to which charitable trusts may be
dedicated include: (I) the relief of poverty; (2) religious purposes; (3) educational pur-
poses; (4). other purposes generally beneficial to the community. This classification
comes from Lord Macnaghten's opinion in Commissioners for Special Purposes of the
Income Tax v. Pemsel [1891] A.G. 531, 538. It is cited in Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150, 1158 (D.D.C. 1971). In addition, Pomeroy lists the purposes to which
charitable trusts may be dedicated (other than those enumerated specifically in the Stat-
ute of Elizabeth) as religious, educational, benevolent (by which is evidently meant "re-
lief of poverty") and other purposes beneficial to the community. POMEROY, §§ 1021-
1024.
Many charitable trusts which Pomeroy regards as being of general public benefit
could be called trusts for municipal purposes. Following this approach, a trust for the
benefit of a fire company was upheld as charitable in Human Fire Co.'s Appeal, 88
Penn. 389, 391 (1879), and in Bethlehem Borough v. Perseverence Fire Co., 81 Penn.
445, 457 (1876). A gift of land in trust for the residents of a town, for their use and
enjoyment was upheld in New Castle Common v. Megison, 1 Boyce (Del.) 361, 77 A.
545, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1207 (1941).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 368 (1957) recognizes two additional
groups of trust purposes, i.e. trusts for municipal purposes, and trusts for the promo-
tion of health. These classes are recognized in Bank of Carthage v. United States, 304
F. Supp. 77, 80 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
"'G. BOGERT, LAw OF TRUSTS 200 (1 Vol. ed. 5th ed. 1973) (hereinafter BOGERT).
102 See, e.g., Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 544 (1867); Dexter v. Gardner, 89
Mass. 243, 247 (1863).
1 " As Lord Macnaghten noted in Commissioners for Special Purposes of the In-
come Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 583, trusts which aid the rich and the poor "are
not the less charitable in the eyes of the law" since "every charity that deserves the
name must do (so] either directly or indirectly."
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charitable nature of a trust is at issue involves a balancing process.'"
The court must determine whether or not a particular purpose is of
sufficient social benefit to outweigh the disadvantages which arise by
exempting the charitable trust from the operation of the rule against
perpetuities.'°° Thus, the process employed in trust cases of balancing
social benefit with social loss is readily analagous to, and consistent
with, the position taken by Dulles and other cases which recognize that
relief of governmental burdens is a valid charitable purpose. The
"governmental burdens" and "public benefit" standard presupposes
precisely such a balancing test as is used in the law of charitable
trusts. 106 The balancing process makes provision not only for organi-
zations of a more conventionally charitable nature (e.g., religious, edu-
cational, and eleomosynary) but also for organizations whose benefit
to society is broadly distributed, and whose continued existence is im-
portant to society.
Furthermore, if courts applying such a balancing test have re-
peatedly determined that a particular activity creates a sufficient pub-
lic benefit to warrant according the trust "charitable trust status," that
conclusion should not be lightly thrown aside by a court seeking to de-
termine whether the same activity is eligible for charitable tax
favors."' Had the Child court recognized the "public benefit" or "goy-
"4 BoGERT,supra note 101, at 201.
" RitsTATENIENT (SmoNm or TitusTs § 368, Comment (b) (1957); BOGERT, supra
note 101, at 201, IV Scorr„supra note 100, at § 368.
106 This analysis of the rationale underlying the trust analogy to tax cases has, to
this writer's knowledge, never been stated expressly. However, the frequent cross ref-
erences in tax cases to the categories of trusts which would qualify as charitable trusts
suggests that the balance of social advantage and disadvantage may be implicit in the
court's reasoning. See, e.g., Duffy v, Birmingham, 190 F.2d 738, 741 (8th Cir. 1941).
107 The degree of authority to be accorded the common law of charitable trusts
has been variously stated. On one extreme, it has been held that the term "charitable"
in the tax codes reenacts the common law definitions. International Reform Fed'n. v.
District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 131 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 531 (1942). There, the District of Columbia Circuit granted tax exempt status to
taxpayer under the District of Columbia Unemployment Insurance Act, which used
language virtually identical to that used in Section 2055(a) to exempt "charitable" or-
ganizations from unemployment tax liability. The organization was dedicated to en-
couraging certain reforms including prevention of drug and alcohol abuse, and encour-
agement of international peace and conciliation. 131 F.2d at 338. The court observed
that:
if the benefit is one which the founder believes to be of public advantage,
and his belief is rational the gift is charitable in the eyes of the law.
That Congress had in mind these broader definitions is confirmed by the
words used in the Act, for by its terms it embraces religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational corporations, thus including in the
exemption ... those organizations designated charitable in the law of
trusts. Consequently, we may properly draw analogy from trust cases.
Id.
In fact, Professor Bogert seems to imply that a conclusion that a trust is charita-
ble for trust law purposes, means that it is necessarily tax exempt. Boomr,sufrra note
101, at 201. This position may be too broadly stated. As Professor Scott points out, the
issues of charitable status under the law of trusts, and under the tax laws are distinctly
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ernmental burdens" standards, and had it undertaken the appropriate
balancing process, and had it then given weight to common-law trust
adjudications with respect to charitable cemeteries, the case could well
have been decided differently.'° 8
different and while ordinarily a charitable trust purpose will be entitled to a statutory
exemption, "[ill is to be borne in mind, however, that the statutes differ ... and do not
necessarily exempt all charitable organizations or trusts." IV A. Scorr, supra note 100 at
§ 368. Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Connecticut has noted, "it may be well to point
out that a trust may be charitable even though it is taxable, for the Legislature can tax
all charitable trusts or such only of them as are characterized by distinguishing ele-
ments." The Westport Bank and Trust Co. v. Fable, 126 Conn. 665, 673-74, 13 A.2d
862, 866 (1940).
A less sweeping conclusion than International Reform Federation's determination
that all common law charitable trust purposes are perforce recognized as charitable
purposes in the tax codes is found in Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108
(3d Cir. 1941). There, the Third Circuit held that a temperance organization was eligi-
ble for deductible bequests, id. at 110, and raised the analogy to charitable trusts on its
own motion. In determining what kind of political activity would be permitted a ben-
eficiary of tax deductible bequests, the court considered what kind and degree of pros-
eletyzing activity was permitted the trustee of a charitable trust. Id.
A similar view, which concluded that charitable trust law provides a useful tool of
interpretation in tax exemption cases was applied by the District of Columbia District
Court in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1152, 1159 (D.D.C.), affd mem. sub nom. Coit
v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), where the court denied tax-exempt status to a racially
exclusive private school. The court noted that charitable trusts cannot be dedicated to
purposes which are contrary to public policy, 330 F. Supp. at 1159 and concluded that
a racially exclusive school could not be charitable, even though education is generally
recognized in trust law as a valid charitable purpose, and is specifically mentioned in
the Code as a tax exempt activity. The Green court noted that the interpretation of
Code provisions by reference to the "common law background was meritorious," id. at
1161, and noted that "the common law of charitable trust can be used for construction
of the Code." Id. at 1159 n.13.
The Green court's reasoning was similar to that used in Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization which focused on the fact that at any given time or place, the needs
and values of a community change so as to make the concept of charitable flexible, re-
flecting the community's sense of which activities answer important needs and which
ones violate important values. This emphasis in Green and in Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization thus focuses on the relative social gains and losses involved in grant-
ing tax benefits to a particular organization. This flexible case by case approach utilizing
the balancing technique of the law of trusts, with due regard for prior decisions, is
more reasonable than the rather slavish adherence to common law determinations of
"charitable purpose" suggested by International Reform Federation.
"" The dissent in Child did not examine the underlying rationale for the proposi-
tion that trust law provided a helpful analogy in tax cases. However, after stating the
proposition that the analogy was "strong", 540 F.2d at 586-88, (Anderson, J., dissent-
ing), the cases dealing with claims that bequests to certain cemeteries qualified as chari-
table trusts, were analyzed. Id. The dissent cited, among other cases, Storr Burying
Ground Ass'n. v. North Lane Cemetery Ass'n., 77 Conn. 83, 95, 58 A. 467, 469 (1904),
for the proposition that a valid cemetery trust may be created where the cemetery is
"open, under reasonable regulations to the use of the public for the burial of the dead."
Id., quoted in Parker v. Fidelity Union Trust Co„ 2 N.J. Super. 362, 390, 63 F.2d 902,
917 (1944) and Davie v. Rochester Cemetery Ass'n., 91 N.H. 494, 495, 23 A.2d 377, 378
(1941). The dissent concluded that the Watertown Cemetery Association would have
qualified under this standard as a beneficiary of a charitable trust, and, accordingly,
should have been regarded as an organization dedicated exclusively to a charitable pur-
pose.
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